Guest OS image 0.6.0-rc0, built by the experimental Debian/mkosi backend.
Register os_image_hash on chain to authorize this image; see
docs/onchain-governance.md.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
os_image_hash | a0601d1d4f94519f8af0f71d6dbda49a746fce295b50763ea9fb617357142227 |
| Git revision | cb4c3736c5f9323440a3fb04172a4d2902c54db0 |
dstack-0.6.0-rc0.tar.gz | 3a5dee5d0ad790b4ba915b0fa4ce62e60bd6292a940ea93365d5c17588890731 |
dstack-0.6.0-rc0-uki.tar.gz | 54e57c4b345242e28849321809dc59faa80628816f24b740b5c9dedb842bcba7 |
image-hashes.txt additionally records the TDX MRTD, the GCP
uki_auth hash and the AWS boot_pcr_digest for this image.
Published to cr.kvin.wang. Pin the digest rather than the tag when deploying:
the tag is mutable, and the compose file's hash is what the app's authorization
is checked against.
| Image | Digest |
|---|---|
cr.kvin.wang/dstack/dstack-kms:0.6.0-rc0 | sha256:caa4da56b6b57460392d0365791b7d21aa32caa15f9d91f9e57326646f21cd79 |
cr.kvin.wang/dstack/dstack-gateway:0.6.0-rc0 | sha256:4ef17d5bf0d59c8c69e318ba75107b06f4768fb03f11e97e4d51ccde6f631691 |
KMS_IMAGE=cr.kvin.wang/dstack/dstack-kms@sha256:caa4da56b6b57460392d0365791b7d21aa32caa15f9d91f9e57326646f21cd79
GATEWAY_IMAGE=cr.kvin.wang/dstack/dstack-gateway@sha256:4ef17d5bf0d59c8c69e318ba75107b06f4768fb03f11e97e4d51ccde6f631691
Both images record their source revision at /etc/.GIT_REV.
These are release-candidate images on a private registry; they are not the
dstacktee/* images published on Docker Hub for stable releases.
Testing this candidate on real TDX and SEV-SNP hardware turned up three defects, two of which were in the published images. Do not use the original digests.
| Image | Original digest — do not use | Why |
|---|---|---|
| KMS | sha256:f614ad188a168d4a5d9824ca0947d15c9bef213b84c797d5621aeb313155a2d6 | Could not start at all |
| Gateway | sha256:fab99f7350f4dcca7af40821b9ebd26ece657458990cec286fb9be69e5885fe7 | Could not obtain a TLS certificate |
KMS (#1128) — the runtime
layer carried no CA certificates, so the collateral and AMD KDS HTTP clients the
KMS builds during onboarding failed with No CA certificates were loaded from the system before it served anything. The replacement contains the same binary and
differs only in shipping ca-certificates.
Gateway (#1129,
#1130) — ACME issuance failed
outright. Let's Encrypt now offers a dns-persist-01 challenge alongside
dns-01; it carries no token, the pinned instant-acme required that field,
and because challenges arrive as one array the unparseable entry took the usable
dns-01 challenge down with it. A second defect then prevented the DNS self-check
from ever passing on zones whose SOA minimum exceeds the check's budget. Both are
fixed in the replacement, which is built from 3266150dc16a6f644a557bbc8aa0c2da53cbbceb
on the release branch.
The gateway respin's revision therefore differs from the guest image's. The
guest OS image itself is unchanged — same tarballs, same os_image_hash, same
measurements.
Verified after the respin: a KMS, a gateway and an application CVM boot on real TDX, the application obtains keys and registers with the gateway, and a wildcard certificate issued from Let's Encrypt staging serves traffic through the proxy to the application.