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dstack 0.6.0-rc0

Version 0.6.0-rc0

0.6.0-rc0

0xa0601d1d4f94519f8af0f71d6dbda49a746fce295b50763ea9fb617357142227Phala KMS 2026-11Not allowedEthereumNot allowedBaseNot allowed

Changelog

Dstack-TEE/dstack@mkosi-os-v0.6.0-rc0

Guest OS image 0.6.0-rc0, built by the experimental Debian/mkosi backend.

Register os_image_hash on chain to authorize this image; see docs/onchain-governance.md.

FieldValue
os_image_hasha0601d1d4f94519f8af0f71d6dbda49a746fce295b50763ea9fb617357142227
Git revisioncb4c3736c5f9323440a3fb04172a4d2902c54db0
dstack-0.6.0-rc0.tar.gz3a5dee5d0ad790b4ba915b0fa4ce62e60bd6292a940ea93365d5c17588890731
dstack-0.6.0-rc0-uki.tar.gz54e57c4b345242e28849321809dc59faa80628816f24b740b5c9dedb842bcba7

image-hashes.txt additionally records the TDX MRTD, the GCP uki_auth hash and the AWS boot_pcr_digest for this image.

KMS and gateway images

Published to cr.kvin.wang. Pin the digest rather than the tag when deploying: the tag is mutable, and the compose file's hash is what the app's authorization is checked against.

ImageDigest
cr.kvin.wang/dstack/dstack-kms:0.6.0-rc0sha256:caa4da56b6b57460392d0365791b7d21aa32caa15f9d91f9e57326646f21cd79
cr.kvin.wang/dstack/dstack-gateway:0.6.0-rc0sha256:4ef17d5bf0d59c8c69e318ba75107b06f4768fb03f11e97e4d51ccde6f631691
KMS_IMAGE=cr.kvin.wang/dstack/dstack-kms@sha256:caa4da56b6b57460392d0365791b7d21aa32caa15f9d91f9e57326646f21cd79
GATEWAY_IMAGE=cr.kvin.wang/dstack/dstack-gateway@sha256:4ef17d5bf0d59c8c69e318ba75107b06f4768fb03f11e97e4d51ccde6f631691

Both images record their source revision at /etc/.GIT_REV.

These are release-candidate images on a private registry; they are not the dstacktee/* images published on Docker Hub for stable releases.

Both container images were replaced after first publication

Testing this candidate on real TDX and SEV-SNP hardware turned up three defects, two of which were in the published images. Do not use the original digests.

ImageOriginal digest — do not useWhy
KMSsha256:f614ad188a168d4a5d9824ca0947d15c9bef213b84c797d5621aeb313155a2d6Could not start at all
Gatewaysha256:fab99f7350f4dcca7af40821b9ebd26ece657458990cec286fb9be69e5885fe7Could not obtain a TLS certificate

KMS (#1128) — the runtime layer carried no CA certificates, so the collateral and AMD KDS HTTP clients the KMS builds during onboarding failed with No CA certificates were loaded from the system before it served anything. The replacement contains the same binary and differs only in shipping ca-certificates.

Gateway (#1129, #1130) — ACME issuance failed outright. Let's Encrypt now offers a dns-persist-01 challenge alongside dns-01; it carries no token, the pinned instant-acme required that field, and because challenges arrive as one array the unparseable entry took the usable dns-01 challenge down with it. A second defect then prevented the DNS self-check from ever passing on zones whose SOA minimum exceeds the check's budget. Both are fixed in the replacement, which is built from 3266150dc16a6f644a557bbc8aa0c2da53cbbceb on the release branch.

The gateway respin's revision therefore differs from the guest image's. The guest OS image itself is unchanged — same tarballs, same os_image_hash, same measurements.

Verified after the respin: a KMS, a gateway and an application CVM boot on real TDX, the application obtains keys and registers with the gateway, and a wildcard certificate issued from Let's Encrypt staging serves traffic through the proxy to the application.